In a series of papers Roger W. Sperry has argued that consciousness, interpreted as a dynamic, emergent, holistic property of cerebral activity, exercises superordinate causal control in the brain. See "A modified concept of consciousness," Psychological Review, Vol. 76, No. 6 (1969) pp. 532-536; and remarks under "Progress on Mind- Brain Problem" in Sperry's Nobel Prize lecture "Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres," Science, Vol. 217 (September 24, 1982) pp. 1223-1226.
Critics -- for example, M. S. Gazzaniga and J. E. LeDoux, The Integrated Mind (Plenum 1978) p. 141 -- have pointed out that Sperry's viewpoints do not mean insight into the mechanism, the "how" of consciousness.
The present essay may be seen as an attempt to give more concrete form to Sperry's suggestions.